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This paper uses a close reading of villagers’ responses to the death in childbirth of a Muslim woman to
raise questions about India’s current policy emphasis on institutional delivery as a means of reducing
maternal mortality. After introducing the context and methods of our research, we describe recent policy
interventions related to maternal health, including the National Rural Health Mission established in
2005. We then outline villagers’ commentaries on the speciﬁc maternal death, focusing on the costs to
women’s health (and sometimes life) of high fertility; the lack of care available from rural government
facilities and staff and the preference for delivering at home with the aid of local practitioners; the
ﬁnancial constraints that make people hesitate to seek medical treatment; and the high costs of private
treatment and the poor treatment experienced in government facilities. Our core argument is that
government health care provision in rural Uttar Pradesh is embedded in a moral universe characterised
by widespread and long-term mistrust of state services and that encouraging institutional deliveries
without addressing the perceptions of potential service users is a seriously ﬂawed approach to reducing
maternal mortality. The paper draws primarily on ethnographic research funded by the Wellcome Trust
during 2002e2005, in a Muslim village in rural Bijnor district (in north-western Uttar Pradesh).
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Anjam: Children are born in the village inside houses. Women
are not taken to the town. Only ‘when the boat has started
sinking’ [jab kashtı dubne lagı, i.e. at the very last moment] do
they run off to town. (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 19 February 2003; all
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 license. summer 2002, Razia was pregnant again but matters went badly
wrong: after a long labour, she was taken to the government
women’s hospital in Bijnor town, where she and the baby had both
died shortly after admission.
This paper juxtaposes villagers’ commentaries on Razia’s tragic
experiencewith policy initiatives aimed at combating high levels of
maternal mortality. After describing the context and methods of
our research, we describe recent policy interventions related to
maternal health, including the National Rural Health Mission
[NRHM] established in 2005, under which women are encouraged
to deliver their babies in institutions rather than at home. Drawing
on our long-term ﬁeldwork, we then present the villagers’ accounts
of Razia’s death and their perceptions of the health care services
available to them.
The success of policy initiatives such as NHRM certainly requires
that systemic failures of provision are remedieddbut it is also vital
to foreground and address the perceptions of those supposedly
being served by such initiatives. Our core argument is that the
advocacy of institutional deliveries is not entering a morally neutral
terrain. Rather, government health care provision in rural UP
is embedded in a moral universe characterised by widespread
and long-term mistrust of state services. Clearly, supply-side
problemsdlack of equipment or technically skilled staffdneed to
be dealt with if ‘safe’ delivery is to become the norm. Indeed,
villagers often point to such limitations in the government health
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government health staffdabout illegal demands for payment and
demeaning and discriminatory dealings with patients, for instan-
cedmake it unlikely that women will readily opt for delivery in
a government institution. Evidence from elsewhere in UP and India
more generally indicates that the villagers in Jhakri are by nomeans
unusual in their critical stancesdwhilst early evaluations of NRHM
suggest that extortion and rudeness continue to be experienced by
women seeking institutional deliveries.
Research context and methods
This paper draws on our long-term ethnographic work in rural
Bijnor district, in north-western UP. In 2001, Bijnor town (district
headquarters, population about 100,000) had two government
hospitals, one general and one for women, plus some 20 private
nursing homes offering obstetric services. The district’s population
was about 3.1 million, of whom about 1.3 million were Muslims;
about 34 per cent of the rural population isMuslim (Census of India,
2001). In UP, Muslims comprise about 18 per cent of the state’s
overall population and are a socially and economicallymarginalised
population (Sachar, 2006).
In 1982e1983, we were based in two villages to which we
returned several times between 1982 and 2002e2005. They are
about 5 km by metalled road from Bijnor town. Dharmnagri had
a Hindu and Dalit/ex-Untouchable population of 1125 in 2002;
there is a government Additional Primary Health Center (PHC) on
its periphery. About 500 m away is Jhakri, the main focus of this
paper. Jhakri is a Muslim village with a population of around 665 in
2002, mainly Sheikhsda middle ranking caste-like groupdalong
with a handful of Teli and Julaha households. A few adult women in
Jhakri were both born andmarried there, but over 92 per cent of the
married women were born elsewhere, mainly within the district.
Bijnor district shares unfavourable social and demographic
indicators with the rest of UP, but fares relatively well on indicators
of economic development because Green Revolution packages
introduced in the mid-1960s transformed agriculture. The
economic inequalities in Jhakri are not as stark as in many other
Bijnor villages because landholdings are generally small (rarely
more than 0.4e0.8 ha). In Jhakri, Sheikhs own most of the village
land, but few can rely wholly on agriculture. Villagers with little or
no land seek other employment (e.g. plying cycle rickshaws or
working as motor mechanics in Bijnor town, or agricultural labour).
In 1982e1983, our research focused on the social organisation of
childbearing. We collected quantitative data (including household
censuses andmaternity histories for all the ever-married women in
the two villages) and qualitative data (ethnographic observations,
informal conversations, and especially semi-structured interviews
with twenty key informant couples in each village, covering
childbearing, family planning and health care, as well as household
politics, marriage arrangement, dowry, land, employment, educa-
tion, migration). We also interviewed health care providers,
including traditional birth attendants (daı) and untrained practi-
tioners (P. Jeffery, Jeffery, & Lyon, 1989). During subsequent ﬁeld-
work visits, we updated the village data, culminating in the
2002e2005 research, which explored the original key informants’
trajectories, particularly in relation to health care, childbearing,
family building and sustainable livelihoods in the context of social
and economic change since the early 1980s. This research also
entailed interviews with daıs, and rural and urban practitioners, on
which we do not draw directly here.
We have both been involved in planning and conducting the
research, although Patricia did almost all the data collection during
2002e2005. We both speak Hindi and conducted the interviews
ourselves. Ethnographic research, however, is an inherentlydialogic process that entails taking people’s concerns and questions
seriously. Our interviews often became discussions in which
bystandersdhusbands, neighboursdjoined. Tape-recording was
impractical and we have employed women from Bijnor town as
research assistants, primarily as scribes although they also
contributed to the discussions. The assistants took detailed notes
which they wrote up in Hindi immediately afterwards. We checked
the assistants’ reports for completeness and clariﬁed ambiguities of
interpretation before translating the reports into English. These
typed ﬁeldnotes comprise some 4500 single-spaced pages and they
form the basis for the qualitative data analysis. We indexed the data
from the early ﬁeldwork manually onto index cards; for the most
recent data, we used the electronic qualitative data analysis
package Atlas.ti. We constructed nested index categories, with
broad categories sub-divided into ﬁner-grain categories, as well as
indexing named individuals. The broad categories included agri-
cultural production and household organisation, as well as health-
related issues (such as childbearing, family planning, government
health services, government and private medical practitioners). We
indexed every passage in the ﬁeldnotes; where discussions touched
on several topics we indexed them under each appropriate cate-
gory. Our close familiarity with the data enabled us to conduct
searches of the indexed material to develop emergent analytical
categories, look for counter-examples and (for selected topics)
tabulate the qualitative data. This paper draws on such consoli-
dated information about our discussions with villagers on the
topics that we address below. The quotations in this paper are from
our translations, selected to highlight either general views or the
range of views on a particular issue.
The research received ethical approval from the research ethics
committee of the School of Social and Political Science (University of
Edinburgh) and we have followed the ethical guidelines of the
British Sociological Association throughout our research (see http://
www.britsoc.co.uk/equality/StatementþEthicalþPractice.htm). Our
guarantees of conﬁdentiality and anonymity and our frequent visits
since 1982 have been vital in building the trust that is reﬂected in
numerous conversations with villagers who have (for example)
criticised government health staff without fear of recriminations.
This paper focuses on villagers’ perceptions and experiences of
seeking health care. It draws mainly on discussions in Jhakri during
2002e2005, but is informed by our earlier ﬁeldwork in the two
villages. Updating the maternity histories often resulted in wide-
ranging discussions about institutional deliveries, family planning
and child immunisation, for instance, including unsolicited
comments about Razia’s death, which had occurred shortly before
Patricia’s arrival in September 2002. Villagers certainly knew of
other womenwho had died in childbirthdbut Razia’s was the only
maternal death in either Jhakri or Dharmnagri during the 20 years
we had worked there (although some women reported what they
considered ‘near-misses’ that were averted by emergency hospital
admissions) (P. Jeffery & Jeffery, 2008). Moreover, Jhakri is
a compact village and news spreads rapidly. It is unsurprising that
Razia’s experiences became such a talking point, often referred to
by villagers wanting to emphasise points germane to their own
childbearing experiences or health care issues in general. Before
examining villagers’ perceptions of Razia’s death, however, we
outline the wider background in UP.
Maternal mortality in Uttar Pradesh
North India (including UP) has high maternal mortality ratios:
MMRs for UP (including Uttaranchal) were estimated to be about
900e950 in the early 1980s and 700e750 by 1990 (Bhat, 2002); by
2001e2003, they were 517 (95 per cent CI 461e573) (Registrar-
General India, 2006) and by 2004e2006, 440 (95 per cent CI
P. Jeffery, R. Jeffery / Social Science & Medicine 71 (2010) 1711e1718 1713384e495) (Registrar-General India, 2009). Vital events registration
is unreliable and these estimates are derived from special surveys.
With some 5 million births in UP annually, there are at least 25,000
and possibly as many as 35,000 maternal deaths per annum.
Maternal mortality reﬂects several interlinked causes: medical
conditions directly associated with childbearing (e.g. haemor-
rhage, sepsis, eclampsia, obstructed labour); other medical condi-
tions (e.g. malaria, heart disease); and socio-economic factors such
as patterns of gender politics that result in early marriage and high
fertility, and compromise access to nutrition, health care and
contraception, especially amongst the poor, villagers and margin-
alised communities. Indian government policies have done little to
address the social determinants of maternal mortality: rather, as
elsewhere in the global South, the approach has typically been top-
down and narrowly medical in orientation (Sen, Govender, &
Cottingham, 2007; Sen, }Ostlin, & George, 2007).
In UP, Government health services have been dogged by long-
term inadequacies that bias access to health care in general, to the
detriment of those very womenmost at risk in childbearing. Nearly
80 per cent of UP’s population lives in rural areas, yet government
facilities reﬂect a marked urban bias and rural facilities are gener-
ally located only in larger villages. Thusmany patients cannot easily
access medical attention. Further, rural facilities often lack basic
equipment and their full component of qualiﬁed medical staff
(whether because of unﬁlled posts or staff absenteeism) (Devarajan
& Shah, 2004: p. 910; Infrastructure Division, 2006; IIPS, 2003;
Planning Commission, 2002: Vol. 2, pp. 86e87; Sen, Iyer, &
George, 2002: p. 293; Vora et al., 2009). Restrictions on who may
administer anaesthesia (for instance) further reduce villagers’
access to emergency obstetric care (Mavalankar & Sriram, 2009).
Budgetary cuts imposed through World Bank loans in the 1990s
and early 2000s further undermined the UP state’s already weak
capacity to ﬁnance its health care sector. Meanwhile, the bur-
geoning private sector now dominates curativemedical caredoften
requiring poor villagers to make out-of-pocket expenditures that
they can ill afford (P. Jeffery & Jeffery, 2008).
Until the early 2000s, antenatal clinic-based monitoring was the
main means of addressing maternal mortality. Yet recent National
Family Health Survey (NFHS) data from UP indicate that only about
26 per cent of pregnant women made three antenatal visits and
only about 8 per cent of all pregnant women received iron-folic acid
for six months before their most recent delivery (Government of
India, 2007). Moreover, women from poor and marginalised
communities tended to have least antenatal care, and that, too, of
generally low technical and interpersonal quality (CRR, 2008: pp.
15e17; Pallikadavath, Foss, & Stones, 2004; Rani, Bonu, & Harvey,
2008).
In 2005dthree years after Razia’s deathdIndia’s National Rural
Health Mission (NRHM) was launched. The NRHM reﬂects the
changing priorities in global discourse towards the conditions of
delivery and the promotion of ‘essential obstetric care’, which
includes ‘skilled’ birth attendants (SBAs) and institutional deliv-
eries, buttressed by comprehensive (or emergency) obstetric care
(operating facilities, blood banks etc.) and effective referral systems
(e.g. Berer, 2007; Berer & Ravindran, 1999; Freedman et al., 2005:
especially pp. 77e94, 132e135; Maine, 1999; WHO, 1999). Various
NRHM provisions were intended to counter the ‘three phases of
delay’ (delay in seeking treatment, in reaching a facility and in
obtaining care once there) (Thaddeus & Maine, 1990). Incentive
payments under Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY, or Mother Protection
Programme) should encourage women to deliver in institutions
(Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2006); referral systems
should guarantee their timely arrival; and upgraded facilities and
trained staff should ensure prompt and safe delivery care. Village
women trained as Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) andintegrated with existing health staff would provide antenatal,
intrapartum and postnatal care (Rajalakshmi, 2005), motivate
women to seek institutional deliveries and accompany labouring
women to the relevant facilities.
Preliminary evaluations of NRHM indicate serious supply-side
limitations. Overall, spending of earmarked funds has progressed
very slowly (USAID, 2007), so the health care system cannot
respond adequately to the NRHM demands. As one of the eight
Empowered Action Group (or ‘low-performing’) states, UP was
allocated additional NRHM fundingdbut the programme has been
30e40 per cent under-spent in all its ﬁrst three years (HRW, 2009:
p. 27). ASHA training programmes are seriously behind schedule
and critics question the capacity of referral systems and of
Government institutions to guarantee the comprehensive and high
quality care necessary to ensure safe outcomes (CRR, 2008; CHSJ,
2007; HRW, 2009). Moreover, the NRHM’s progress is evaluated
primarily via increases in institutional deliveries: bizarrely, there is
no mechanism to ensure that maternal deaths are systematically
recorded (HRW, 2009: p. 12ff.).
Villagers’ accounts of Razia’s death
In addition to system failures, however, it is also vital to
understand the demand side: villagers’ perceptions of local health
care options. Strikingly, people’s commentaries on Razia’s death
were not differentiated by age, marital status or economic position.
Their accounts often straddled issues that we have separated here
for ease of presentation. They were, of course, given several months
after the event and villagers were often vague about medical
detailsdbut for our argument, the ‘truth-value’ of these accounts is
less important than what they convey about villagers’ interpreta-
tions of the tragedy, their attributions of causality and blame and
the likely effects on future decision-making.
Fertility and maternal health
Our ﬁeldnotes from 1982 onwards contain numerous
comments made by women on the risks of childbirth and the
damage to health of undergoing numerous pregnancies. One
woman asserted in 1982, ‘women become old bearing children.
They can’t keep their strength. Their spirit drains away’ (P. Jeffery
et al., 1989: p. 172, see also pp. 167e175). Twenty years later the
refrain was much the same: during her twelfth pregnancy, another
woman said:
There are 10e10, 12e12 children. You can neither look after
yourself nor the children. You can’t ﬂourish. Just as you’ve cared
for one, another is born. The ‘vile hardship’ [gandı afat]
continues. How can a person ﬂourish? (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 24
February 2003).
Similar understandings were reﬂected in commentaries on
Razia’s death:
Talib: Women here don’t understand that this [childbirth] is
women’s death. Just look at Razia. She herself died in giving
birth. And behind her, her children are worried and her husband
is also worried. She’d had 11e12 children and there was no life
in her body. She had become weak. (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 24
February 2003)
Mehbuba: Some children are their mother’s enemy and they
take their mother with them. [Patricia: How could a small child
be its mother’s enemy?] Many children before they are born eat
their mother. They are their mother’s enemy.
Mehbuba’s married daughter: Razia’s child was also like that. It
ate its mother. (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 4 February 2003)
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clerics in India have generally claimed that Islam forbids contra-
ception or at least sterilisation (though the theological basis is
controversial and contested). This view is widespread amongst
north Indian Muslims and few people in Jhakri think sterilisation is
permissible. Talib (quoted above) is exceptional: he responded to
his wife’s obstetric crisis by taking her to a private hospital, where
she was sterilised at the same time as her stillborn girl was deliv-
ered by Caesarean section (see P. Jeffery, Jeffery, & Jeffrey, 2008). By
contrast, two Jhakri women discussing Razia’s death insisted they
would never use contraception:
Mumtaz (with 9 living children): Listen to what I’m saying!
However many children I have at present, if that many more are
born in future, even then I wouldn’t take anything to stop having
children, or make the gap longer, even if I were to die. In our
village, Razia died in childbirth and so I am also thinking that
death has to come one day or another. So what’s there to fear
about death?
Akbari (with 7 living children): No matter howmany childrenwe
have, we shan’t take any medicines, for we also have to go to
meet Allah. (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 7 February 2003)
But their bravado was unique. Mumtaz’s sister Mehmuda (with
7 living children) is also married in Jhakri: she complained
disgustedly about how her children had been born pell-mell [tale-
upar].
Given the widespread poverty in Jhakri, women’s comparatively
high levels of fertility probably compromise their health. But
Razia’s last pregnancy was additionally complicated by the baby’s
transverse presentation.
Labouring at home
In rural Bijnor, pregnancy is normally dealt with at home. Few
Dharmnagri and Jhakri women attended routine antenatal clinics,
despite the proximity of the Dharmnagri PHC. Razia, however, had
consulted the Auxiliary Nurse-Midwife (ANM) there late in preg-
nancy and had an ultrasound performed in a private facility in
Bijnor towndnot a routine investigation for rural women. There
had been concerns well before Razia’s labour began:
Sabra (the trained daı in Jhakri): The baby was completely
transverse [ara] and I myself told Razia a month before [the
birth]. I told her the baby wouldn’t be born at home and would
have to be born by operation. [Patricia: Did Rashid know that?]
Yes, he did. And Razia had also gone to see the ANM and she also
told Razia that the baby was transverse.. I told her it wouldn’t
be within a daı’s competence. (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 18 October
2004)
Jamila: Razia went to have ultrasound before she had her last
baby and the doctor told her that the baby wouldn’t be born at
home . and that she should come to hospital when the time
was due.. [Patricia: Had Razia told Rashid and the other people
of the house?] Yes, everyone knew that the baby couldn’t be
born at home. And that the doctor had also said the baby was in
danger. (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 9 February 2004)
Villagers in Jhakri and Dharmnagri alike were inclined to think
that private doctors’ recommendations for institutional deliveries
and other interventions were motivated more by thoughts of proﬁt
than medical necessity (see P. Jeffery & Jeffery, 2008). Several
women reported being warned that they should deliver in an
institution, but most stayed at home, and most delivered there
successfully. Razia, then, was not remarkable in remaining at home
despite warnings about the dangers. Sabra (the trained daı) saidthat had she not been visiting her brothers in another village, she
would have recommended that Razia go to hospital:
Razia was having pains for many days but she didn’t tell anyone.
I wasn’t in the village and the [untrained] daı had come from
Chandpuri [a nearby village], but she didn’t say that the casewas
not within her competence. So when the baby’s arm appeared
outside, only then did they take her [Razia] to hospital. (Authors’
ﬁeldnotes 18 October 2004)
The ANM posted at the Dharmnagri PHC was present only
during normal working hours, however, and then only when her
duties did not take her away from the PHC compound. She con-
ducted more deliveries in a small private clinic in her home in
Bijnor town than at the PHC. The PHC doctor played no part in
obstetric cases. Villagers generally responded to these gaps in
provision by calling upon local untrained practitioners. In Razia’s
case, ﬁrst, an untrained daı was called. Strong contractions
continued through one night and the following day. The next
evening a ‘doctor’ was calleddone of several local rural medical
practitioners (RMP), men generally without formal training who
prescribe remedies from their roadside kiosks. RMPs play a prob-
lematic role in childbirth by administering intramuscular injections
of oxytocin to augment contractions (P. Jeffery, Das, Dasgupta, &
Jeffery, 2007). By the early 2000s, almost 50 per cent of the home
deliveries in Dharmnagri and Jhakri featured an RMP and at least
one oxytocin injection. These men rarely examined a labouring
woman to assess the baby’s presentation: they relied on the daı’s
assessment. About the RMP who attended Razia, Qudsia com-
mented ‘he did not tell them that it was not within his competence’
(Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 17 January 2003). Razia’s attendants deemed
her situation serious only when the baby’s arm appeared. With no
one at the PHC responsible for delivering the baby or referring her
elsewhere, she was taken to the government women’s hospital in
Bijnor town on a tractor-trolley requisitioned from a neighbour.
Financial constraints
Rashid’s father had a little land which he had not yet divided
amongst his sons. Consequently, Rashid depended on plying a cycle
rickshaw in Bijnor town and on various kinds of irregular
employment. Villagers were far more vocal about Rashid’s poverty
than about the decision not to take Razia to hospital at the onset of
labour, though interpretations of the decision-making in Razia’s
home differed.
Most commentaries emphasised that Rashid and his family
were not culpabledrather, Rashid’s poverty had made him hesitate
to take Razia to hospital. As it was, Rashid was struggling ﬁnan-
cially. One woman explained, ‘Only when he comes home in the
evening do they cook the food. He brings the vegetables home and
they get cooked.’ Talib and his wife Taranam also highlighted
ﬁnancial considerations:
Talib: Razia from my village died because of poverty. Only the
women of the house were beside her and they had called a daı.
But if they’d taken her to town sooner, then she, poor soul,
wouldn’t have died.
Taranam: Razia died because of lack of money. If there had been
money, she would also [i.e. like Taranam herself] have had an
operation [Caesarean]. (Author’s ﬁeldnotes 24 February 2003)
Some women, however, said Razia should have been taken to
hospital much sooner and that the daı had been suggesting this for
some time before Razia’s in-laws agreed. But for Rashid’s hesita-
tion, Razia would still be alive. Some also said that Rashid had been
reluctant to go around the village cap-in-hand requesting loans to
cover the expenses until it was too late. For instance, when Patricia
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hospital because he had no money, she retorted:
Sabra: Generally people in this village don’t have money. But
when there’s some calamity, they go house-to-house collecting
money. Everyonemakes donations. Oneman takes the person to
hospital and another goes around the village collecting money
and comes [to the hospital] later. Andmeanwhile the patient has
been admitted to hospital and the money is given later. If Rashid
had told people earlier that he had nomoney, then the people of
the village would have made donations and given him the
money, and poor Razia’s life would have been saved. . the
people of the village would certainly have done something or
other to help. (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 18 October 2004)Private medical care and care at the government hospital
In India as a whole, institutional deliveries have become more
common, but the bulk of the increase has been in the private sector
(Vora et al., 2009: pp. 187e188). During 1993e2002, home deliv-
eries still accounted for nine out of ten births in Dharmnagri and
Jhakri, but 54 labours that began at home had ended in an insti-
tution in Bijnor town (out of 620 deliveries in that period). Of these,
only two womendone of them Raziadwent to the government
women’s hospital. The remaining 52 went to private nursing
homes.
Almost all the accounts of institutional deliveries indicated how
reluctant labouring women and their attendants were to seek
hospital admission, even when the labour seemed to be progress-
ing badly. In the midst of an obstetric crisis, villagers would be
poised on a moral knife edge: facing condemnation from fellow
villagers for proﬂigacy if they rushed to town too soon or accusa-
tions of carelessness from neighbours and urban health care
providers alike if they left matters until ‘the boat has started
sinking’. Razia’s case highlights this dilemma.
Covering the costs of private medical care was not necessarily
easy. In the early 2000s, local daily wage rates for agricultural
labourers were about Rs70; a rickshaw driverdsuch as
Rashiddmight earn about Rs100 per day. In private nursing homes
in Bijnor town, episiotomies or forceps deliveries cost around
Rs4,000. Caesarean sections cost about Rs15,000e16,000 for the
operation alone: in other words, at least 200 days’ of a labourer’s
wages. Moreover, with a family member in hospital, income is lost
and travelling and other outlays must be added to the medical
charges. Few villagers could make regular savings and no one had
health insurance. Obtaining bank loans was extremely difﬁ-
cultdespecially during an emergency and especially for the poor.
Without ready cash, going cap-in-hand to kin and neighbours was
precisely what most people had to do. Often, long-term indebted-
ness ensued (P. Jeffery & Jeffery, 2008, 2010).
Villagers considered the costs of medicines and other payments
made in private institutions were generally higher and more vari-
able than those in government institutions (cf. Chakraborty, 2002:
Table 10.9; Mishra, 2005: p. 74). People stressed the serious
ﬁnancial implications of funding private institutional deliveries.
Nevertheless, the overwhelming inclination was to do so. The main
reason for this apparent economic irrationality relates to villagers’
views of the care they receive in government facilities. As else-
where in India, Government facilities were far from free in practice
and villagers considered that expenditures there were less
predictable and more subject to extortion than those in private
facilities. And crucially, villagers reported being treated rudely and
even punitively by government staff, who were also slow to
respond to their medical needs (George, Iyer, & Sen, 2005;
D. Mavalankar & Reddy, 1996; Singh, Lahiri, & Srivastava, 2004).Some women claimed Rashid would have taken Razia to
a private facility if he had been able to raise the cash: he had gone to
the government hospital only because of his anxiety about the costs
of a private delivery. But others asserted that Rashid had been at
fault in taking Razia to the government hospital. Several women
alleged that Razia and her attendants were treated rudely, and
especially that Razia had been slapped and criticised for having
more children despite being poor.
Jamila: Those daıs in the government hospitaldthe ones who
deliver babiesdasked Razia how many children she had. I don’t
know if Razia said 8 or 9, but on hearing this, the nurse slapped
her face saying “you have so many children and even so you are
busy making more.” (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 9 February 2004)
Other women commented that Razia had received dilatory
treatment, and suggested this was because Rashid was a poor
villager without the ‘contacts’ in the hospital or the money to help
expedite the treatment:
Qudsia’s married daughter: Their biggest mistake was taking her
to the government hospital. They don’t even talk properly to
patients there. If they had taken her to a private place, that
would have been good.
Qudsia:When they took her to the government hospital, the doctor
wasveryangryandsaid that theyhadonly justbroughthernow,and
she shouted and swore at thema lot. Thepains increased evenmore
and the doctor was sometimes telling them to get a prescription,
sometimesthis, sometimesthat forher.Thenwhenshe lookedather
[Razia] a long time later, the life was ‘leaving her feet’. She died and
the baby wasn’t even born. (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 17 January 2003)
Women alleged not only that the medical staff failed to do their
work in a timely and efﬁcient manner, but that Razia was given
a poisonous injection either because she had so many children or
because Rashid could not pay what was being demanded:
Hanifa: Rashid was poor and he also didn’t have any ‘known-
recognised’ people either, so he took Razia to the government
hospital. We’ve heard that Razia was given an injection and that
the doctornı [female doctor] had also slapped her once. Everyone
says that if she’d been taken to a private hospital shewould have
survived. She was taken to the government hospital and that
was why the poor thing had to ‘wash her hands of her life’.
(Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 25 February 2004)
Mehmuna’s mother: Runningerunning they took her to the
government hospital. There they were asked which child this
was. And the simpleton [sıdha-mann admı] told them it was the
ninth. So the doctor gave a poisonous injection. It wasn’t that
she heated the baby’s arm [anch dena] so that the child would
pull its arm inside again. On top of not doing that, she gave
a poisonous injection. [Patricia: How do you know it was
a poisonous injection?] It wasn’t even 5 min after the injection
that Razia died.
Mehmuna: When someone dies naturally, their colour remains
the same. But she became completely dark. Her face became
completely black. It’s only from poison that a person turns black.
(Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 17 February 2004)
The following discussion with Latifan, her unmarried daughter
and a neighbour Firozi captures the complex interplay of consid-
erations upon which villagers reﬂected. Our research assistant
Shaila had asked if Razia was taken to hospital very late:
Latifan: Razia was indeed taken late. She’d been having pains for
two days and then at night half of the baby’s arm appeared
outside and even so they didn’t take her to hospital. The poor
thing died because of that.
Patricia: Didn’t the daı see her?
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for want of money. If they’d had money, they would have taken
her to hospital two days earlier. Townwomen go to hospital 2e3
days before the birth. They have money, that’s why. They and
their child both survive. The poor soul, Razia, died because of
poverty.
Firozi: If they’d made some money arrangements, they could
have got money from anywhere at all, but they didn’t pay any
attention. And they got her admitted in the government
hospital.
Patricia: Would they have taken her to a private hospital if they
had money?
Latifan’s daughter: Then they would have taken her ‘private’.
Latifan: Razia had been having a great deal of pain for 2e3 days
and her baby must have died just at the very time when her
hand appeared. Then after spending a whole night [at home]
they took her to hospital, so then the poor thing could only die.
They’re blaming the doctor.
Shaila: Who’s blaming the doctor?
Latifan: The people of the village are.
Patricia: But why wasn’t she taken to hospital earlier? Was it
because therewould be strangemen there and it was amatter of
embarrassment, or was it because they were afraid of the
expense?
Latifan: It was a matter of fearing the expense. If there’s no
money and you go to hospital, you have to pay Rs15e20,000
straight away. Villagers don’t possess money.
Patricia: We’ve heard that some doctors don’t speak properly to
patients or that they discriminate because of money or because
people are Muslimsdis that the case?
Latifan: If you give the doctors their full money, they do their
work properly.
Patricia: What happens if the full money isn’t there or it comes
late?
Latifan’s daughter: Then they give a poisonous injection. Razia
didn’t have money and so the doctor gave her a poisonous
injection.
Patricia: Is that true?
Firozi: It’s absolutely true. The doctor gave her a poisonous
injection and the doctor also gave Razia a slap.
Latifan: If Razia had told them she had 2e3 children, then the
doctor would have looked after her properly. But Razia told
them she had exactly as many as there were and that was why
she was slapped. She was told that she has so many children
and even so she still has the desire to produce more. If someone
is poor or someone is rich, doctors do not show any partiality.
They just need the full money. (Authors’ ﬁeldnotes 27 January
2004)
There are several possible explanations for Razia’s sudden
death: the injection might have been oxytocin (which resulted in
uterine rupture) or an antibiotic (to which she had a severe allergic
reaction), or she might have been about to die anyway. But,
crucially for our argument, villagers considered it entirely plausible
that medical staff had deliberately administered a deadly injection:
Razia’s legs became ‘cold’ [lifeless, a sure sign that she was about to
die] almost instantly after the injection and when her body was
returned to Jhakri for burial the next morning, they saw that it had
become ‘blue’ or ‘black’.Razia’s experiences in a longer timeframe
These commentaries on Razia’s death echo critiques of
government health services that we have heard repeatedly in both
Dharmnagri and Jhakri throughout our ﬁeldwork since 1982.People in both villages often criticised the quality of rural services:
the poor condition of the facilities, the lack of equipment and
medical supplies. Villagers feared being unable to meet govern-
ment employees’ demands for payments in case they were pun-
ished. And they often commented about staff behaviourdwhether
their absenteeism, lack of incentive towork assiduously or rude and
brusque dealings with patients. In 1982e1983 and in 1990e1991,
we lived on the Dharmnagri PHC compound and witnessed
numerous interactions between government staff and villagers that
endorse villagers’ allegations. Sometimes we also accompanied
villagers to urban facilities and can conﬁrm the tenor of interactions
there. In 1982, for instance, we took a woman in obstructed labour
to the government women’s hospital in Bijnor town. Thinking that
Patricia was Punjabi, staff there verbally abused her because she
insisted that they provide treatment at night. We subsequently
observed staff slapping the labouring woman several times when
she cried out in pain, and demanding money for administering
medications or cleaning around her bed (see P. Jeffery & Jeffery,
2008; P. Jeffery et al., 1989: pp. 114e118). In brief, villagers were
often treated in government facilities not simply (if at all) in terms
of their medical need, but according to other characteristics, such as
dirty or ragged clothing that signalled their poverty or rural back-
ground, rustic speech or a bevy of small children in tow (R. Jeffery,
Jeffery, & Rao, 2007; Koenig, Foo, & Joshi, 2000).
Another crucial component of villagers’ perceptions of govern-
ment services is the family planning programme. It was introduced
in the 1950s with sterilisation the most strongly advocated
contraceptive method. Especially, but not only, during the political
Emergency in 1975e1977, staff were set sterilisation targets and the
programme was coercive and target-driven, particularly in relation
to religious minorities and the poor in the high fertility areas of
north India (e.g. Connelly, 2006; Gwatkin, 1979; Vicziany, 1983).
Since the mid-1990s, the target-driven approach has declined
somewhat, but the rural ‘family welfare’ (i.e. family planning)
component of reproductive and child health expenditures received
increased funding during the 1990s (despite the general trend of
health sector cuts) (see Dev & Mooij, 2005: p. 100; Qadeer, 1998)
and the family planning programme retains its high proﬁle.
In 1982e1983, with memories of the Emergency still fresh,
many villagers in both Dharmnagri and Jhakri initially suspected us
of being involved in the sterilisation programme (P. Jeffery & Jeffery,
2010). Gradually, though, female sterilisation has become normal-
ised in Dharmnagri and by 2005 about 30 per cent of the Dharm-
nagri women under 40 had been sterilised, compared with only
three Jhakri women. People in Jhakridand Muslims in north India
more generallydhave all too often felt themselves vulnerable to
the pressures of the Indian government’s family planning pro-
gramme (P. Jeffery & Jeffery, 2006: pp. 39e42, pp. 108e116; 2010; P.
Jeffery et al., 2008; P. Jeffery et al., 1989: p. 200 ff.; R. Jeffery &
Jeffery, 1997). Indeed, not only family planning workers are
preoccupied with their fellow-citizens’ fertility: we took Najma to
consult an ophthalmologist, whose ﬁrst questions were how many
children she had and whether she had been sterilised (P. Jeffery &
Jeffery, 1996: pp. 53e68). More recently, many Muslims in north
Indiadincluding in Jhakridhave mistrusted the coercive tactics
adopted during the polio eradication programme and rumours
have been rife that polio vaccine renders children infertile (P. Jeffery
& Jeffery, 2010).
There is, then, widespread and lingeringmistrust of government
health care services, particularly but not only amongst Muslims.
Villagers consider government services inadequate in terms of
equipment, medicines and stafﬁng, but they also object to being
treated in a dilatory, discourteous or greedy fashion by government
staff. Village women generally wanted to avoid going to govern-
ment institutions for their deliveries and preferred to stay at home,
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practitioners). For Muslims, the government’s ﬁxation with family
planning compounds their lack of faith in government provision.
Women in Jhakri were not surprised to hear that Raziadwhose
name and clothing would have marked her as a Muslimdhad been
rudely questioned about her children, slapped and chided by
hospital staff, and treated in a callous way before being given what
they believed was a fatal injection.
Discussion
Given this history, it is unlikely that there will be heavy demand
for institutional deliveries in rural Bijnor. We have not conducted
in-depth ﬁeldwork in Jhakri since NRHM began, but indications
from Bijnor town and elsewhere in UP support this view. In
November 2007, during another research project, we visited the
government women’s hospital in Bijnor town. The medical super-
intendent reported that the labour ward bed-occupancy rate had
increased from 10.7 per cent in 2003e2004 (just before she was
posted there) to 19.3 per cent in 2006e2007. Annualised ﬁgures
suggested that there would be almost 300 normal deliveries and
nearly 225 Caesarean sections in 2007. Yet some 2500e3000 babies
are born in Bijnor district each day. In UP as whole, deliveries in
institutions (public or private) accounted for 21.4 per cent of all
deliveries before NRHM was introduced and 24.5 per cent in
2007e2008. There are wide variations between districts and
between rural and urban areas but these ﬁgures suggest a general
and continuing reluctancednot just among Muslimsdto seek
institutional deliveries (IIPS, 2009).
A Human Rights Watch report (focusing on UP) and a Center for
Reproductive Rights report both evaluate the NRHM from a human
rights perspective. They present evidence of systemic failures: lack
of equipment, drugs and blood, insufﬁcient accessible staff
competent to provide emergency obstetric care (such as Caesarean
sections). In other words, institutional deliveries in UP are not
necessarily ‘safe’ deliveries (CRR, 2008: p. 18ff.; HRW, 2009: p.
30ff.). Staff corruption and demeaning and discriminatory treat-
ment continue to compromise access for the poor and marginal-
ised. Deliveries in government institutions are supposedly free and
the JSY payment should provide cash assistance for the mother and
baby. But just 4.7 per cent of women giving birth in UP between
April 2006 and the IIPS survey date (November 2007eApril 2008)
received the JSY payment (IIPS, 2009) (probably partly because
most institutional deliveries in UP are in private facilities). Women
sometimes reported that staff demanded a share of the JSY
payments for services rendered or that payments were made
months in arrears; often women were either discharged before the
risk of post-partum haemorrhage was past or compelled to remain
in the institution longer than theywished in order to receive the JSY
payment (CHSJ, 2007: pp. 109e117). Some government staff nurses
refused to hand over the baby unless they were paid; others made
false claims about women who had delivered at home and took
a share of the JSY payment; the targets for institutional deliveries
provided an additional incentive for government staff to inﬂate the
numbers (HRW, 2009: pp. 11e12, 51ff.). There is caste-based
discrimination and cruel and degrading treatment such as beating,
pinching and name-calling (e.g. CRR, 2008: pp. 20e23; HRW, 2009:
p. 27, pp. 46e47, p. 57) and indications that the polio and family
planning campaigns divert attention from maternal health
concerns (HRW, 2009: p. 28, pp. 35e36). In other words, the
perceptions of people in Jhakri are echoed in UP more generally.
The Human Rights Watch and Center for Reproductive Rights
reports both emphasise that human rights entitlements entail
access to health, not just health care (CRR, 2008; HRW, 2009).
Clearly NRHM is not expected to tackle the social and economicdeterminants of women’s vulnerability. But improving access to
quality health care should go beyond a focus on facilities, equip-
ment and skilled attendants. Women’s birthing experiences must
be not just medically ‘safe’ but also ones in which they are not
confronted with staff who embezzle government funds, extort
money illegally and treat patients in distress in discriminatory,
demeaning and punitive ways. By emphasising the views of people
supposedly served by the NRHM, we want to highlight how
people’s memories of their past relationships with state services
linger and can generate resistance to new policy initiatives among
at least some sections of the citizenry. Where citizens do not regard
the state as entirely benign, where trust has been violated,
attending only to the narrowly technical aspects of childbirth
cannot guarantee the increased popularity of institutional deliv-
eries. Put another way: delay in seeking treatment is only tempo-
rally prior to the second and third phases of delay. Perceptions of
the problems associated with institutional caredwhether technical
or interpersonaldmay themselves delay the quest for treatment
(cf. George et al., 2005; HRW, 2009; Singh et al., 2004). Talking of
‘delays’ in seeking institutional care can easily become victim-
blaming, in which villagers are portrayed as foolish or casual. But
there were compelling reasons why Razia remained at home so
long despite the warnings about her safety, and why choosing
between government and private care was fraught: a lethal mix of
Rashid’s poverty, the Dharmnagri ANM’s unavailability, and
mistrust of government health care services and staff more
generally.
Improving the accountability of front-line Government health
staff is not easy, however. As in Jhakri, most patients respond by
withdrawal (or ‘exit’) from government services rather than raising
their voices to complain. The poor feel vulnerable to repercussions,
and actually following a complaint through to a conclusion is costly
and time-consuming. Front-line staff themselves are at the bottom of
a power hierarchy and can rarely change the systemic conditions that
provide them with inadequate resources and support for women
needing emergency obstetric care. Improved training procedures,
incentive structures that reward staff who are honest and polite as
well as competent, and legal procedures to deal with corrupt or
abusive staff (such as Public Interest Litigation sponsored by civil
society organisations) would all make a difference. As yet, though,
there is no sign that such issues are being taken seriously. Unlike
erecting new buildings and buying inmore drugs, such shifts require
the dismantling of a long-standing political economy of health care
provision. The most poverty-stricken and powerless members of
Indian society experience deep-seated class, caste and urban preju-
dices against theminmanycontexts, includingwhen theyseekhealth
care. Encouraging institutional deliveries without rectifying these
serious shortcomings in the modes of operation within government
services is a seriouslyﬂawedapproach to reducingmaternalmorality.
There is a long-term credibility gap: persuading villagers of the
superiority of institutional deliveries will be an uphill task.References
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